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This paper seeks to examine claims bv 
adult children under the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 
1975 ('the act') in the light of the recent 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Snapes 
v Aram, The Times, 8 May 1998.
Any child of a deceased person 
qualifies to make a claim under s. l(l)(c) 
of the act if the will or the intestacy rules 
(or a combination of the two) fails to 
make reasonable financial provision for 
the applicant. Prior to the 1975 act 
coming into force, adult unmarried
o
daughters might qualify' for relief under 
the statutory provisions then in force (the 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938), as 
might an adult child incapable of 
maintaining himself by reason of mental 
or physical disability, but there was no 
general right for adult children to apply.
The 1975 act expressly made 'fresh 
provision for empowering the court to 
make orders for the making out of the
o
estate of a deceased person of provision' 
(see the preamble to the act), for various 
classes of applicant, including adult 
children. Although, as Oliver] made clear 
in the leading case in Re Coventry, deceased 
[1980] 1 Ch 461, this 'fresh' provision 
torms part of a continuum and the body 
of case law, built up under the earlier 
legislation, is not to be ignored, this is of 
relatively little value in considering claims 
by adult children since these could not 
generally be made under the old law. 
There is also relatively little post-1975 
act guidance.
It is suggested that the significance of 
Snapes lies primarily in its emphasis on
the balancing exercise. This must be 
carried out by the court when weighing 
the statutory criteria for evaluating a 
claim set out in s. 3 of the act and in 
laying to rest any misconceptions which 
may have arisen in certain quarters. Post- 
1975 pronouncements by the Court of 
Appeal, particularly in Coventry and in 
Re Jennings, deceased [1994] Ch 286, 
which have the effect of requiring an 
adult child to establish either a moral 
claim or the existence of special 
circumstances before a claim can be 
successful are mostly responsible for the 
confusion and misconceptions 
mentioned above. Snapes also contains 
some useful observations on:
  the effect of delay;
  the significance of a change in
o o
circumstances after the death of the 
testator; and
  the extent to which account should be 
taken of the testator's expression of 
feelings towards an applicant.
MORAL CLAIM/SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCE
Coventry concerned an adult male child 
of the deceased in his forties. He had 
lived with his late father in the latter's 
house. The applicant's mother had been 
estranged from his father for many years 
and there had been no contact between 
them. She was 74 and living in a small 
council flat at the date of the hearing. She 
had an equitable interest in the 
deceased's house and stood to inherit the 
rest under the intestacy rules. The 
applicant, who earned a very modest 
living as a chauffeur and who was about 
to lose the roof over his head as the result 
of his father's death intestate, duly made 
application under the 1975 act. His claim 
was rejected by Oliver], whose judgment 
was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Oliver J was, rightly, at pains to express 
that the court has no carte blanche to 
rewrite a will or the intestacy laws laid 
down by Parliament. At p. 475c, he said:
'It cannot be enough to say "here is a son 
of the deceased; he is in necessitous
circumstances; there is property of the deceased 
which could be made available to assist him 
but which is not available if the deceased's 
dispositions stand; therefore those dispositions 
do not make reasonable provision jor the 
applicant". There must, as it seems to me, be 
established some sort oj moral claim by the 
applicant to be maintained by the deceased or 
at the expense of his estate beyond the mere 
fact of a blood relationship, some reason why 
it can be said that, in the circumstances, it is 
unreasonable that no or no greater provision 
was in fact made.'
Goff LJ commented on this passage in 
the Court of Appeal, at p. 487:
'But it is said that ... Oliver J fell into 
error ... he in effect made a moral obligation 
a precondition of such an application 
succeeding ...I reject [this]. Oliver J nowhere 
said that a moral obligation was a 
prerequisite of an application under si (I )(c); 
nor did he mean any such thing. It is true 
that he said a moral obligation was required, 
but in my view that was on the facts of this 
case, because he found nothing else sufficient 
to produce unreasonableness.'
As Butler-Sloss LJ observed in Snapes, 
the reasons for the decision in Coventry 
were 'neatly described' by Nourse LJ in 
Jennings, at p. 295:
'on an application by an adult son ... who 
is able to earn, and earns, his own living 
there must be some special circumstance, 
typically a moral obligation of the deceased 
towards him ... [The] principle ...is 
applicable no less to the case oj a daughter ... 
In [Coventry] Oliver J was of the opinion that 
financial provision was reasonably required jor 
the applicant's maintenance. But his 
application failed because the deceased owed 
him no moral or other obligation and no 
other special circumstance was shown.'
The applicant in Jennings, a male in his 
prime with his own business and a 
comfortable lifestyle, failed in the Court 
of Appeal on the same basis as the 
applicant in Coventry. In the absence of a 
moral claim or special circumstances, 
both claims were held to fail.
A claim did succeed in Re: Goodchild, 
deceased [1997] 1 WLR 1216 but the 
Court of Appeal held that a moral 
obligation by the deceased to his only son 
had been established. The deceased and 
his first wife had executed wills in 
identical terms leaving their respective 
estates to each other in the event of 
surviving the deceased spouse by 28 days 
but otherwise on trust for their only son. 
It was decided that the doctrine of 
mutual wills did not apply, so that the 
testator, who had inherited his first wife's 
estate, was legally free to leave his (and 
her) estate to his second wife but that, in 
all the circumstances, the deceased was 
under a moral obligation to devote as 
much of his first wife's estate to his son, 
who was in straitened circumstances, as 
would have come to him if the doctrine 
ot mutual wills had operated. Goodchild is, 
therefore, a moral claim case.
Snapes appears to be the only 1975 act 
case to have reached the Court of Appeal 
in which an adult applicant succeeded 
despite no moral claim or special 
circumstance being established. The facts 
of the case were somewhat unusual but, 
on those facts, the Court of Appeal 
(Butler-Sloss LJ, Judge LJ and Sir John 
Knox) unanimously held that it was not 
fatal to the claim that neither a moral 
claim nor a special circumstance was 
established.
The applicant was 58 when her father 
died. By the date of trial she was 69 (and, 
by the date of the appeal, 71). Her age 
was clearly a relevant factor. As Butler- 
Sloss LJ observed:
'The facts found by the judge showed that 
the Plaintiff had been approaching the end of 
her working life at the death oj her father and 
at the date of the hearing was 69 and had 
long retired. She no longer had an earning 
capacity or any hope of improving her 
condition in life. Although she lived with Mr 
Pearce she was not married to him and both 
were in modest financial circumstances, hers 
being described ... as stringent.'
It was submitted by the appellants that 
the applicant's claim should fail, despite 
her circumstances, since no moral claim 
or special circumstance had been found 
by the judge. All three members of the 
Court of Appeal rejected this view.
Butler-Sloss LJ said:
'on the facts oj this case, which ... were... 
markedly different from the facts in Coventry, 
the judge was not obliged to find a special
circumstance, such as a moral obligation. He 
was entitled to look at all the relevant factors 
as enjoined under s. 3 and ... to make the 
decision that he did' (periodical payments 
of £3,000 per annum, index-linked for 
life).
Judge LJ had this observation:
'In my judgment Coventry cannot be 
regarded as authorityJor the proposition that 
unless an adult applicant in reasonable health 
is able to establish a moral obligation owed by 
the deceased the claim is bound to Jail. Such a 
conclusion would be contrary to the terms of 
s. 3(1) (a)—(g). The decision in Re Coventry 
was considered in Jennings where Nourse LJ 
concluded that in the case of an adult son of 
the deceased who was Jit and able to work, 
and in work, some "special circumstance, 
typically a moral obligation" was required ... 
The use of the word "typically" is revealing. 
Nourse LJ did not say "invariably" or 
"necessarily". If he had done so he would have 
been using language, which does not appear 
among the statutory criteria. Accordingly 
whilst accepting that a claim by an adult with 
an established earning capacity may very well 
Jail if a moral claim or special circumstance 
cannot be established, in an appropriate case 
the court is entitled to conclude that the claim 
should succeed notwithstanding their absence.'
Sir John Knox emphasised the balancing 
exercise which the court must carry out:
'In the great majority of cases ... the court 
is involved in a balancing exercise among the 
many factors to which s3 of the 1975 Act 
requires the court to have regard ...In 
Coventry there was placed in the scales a factor 
of major weight ... that was that the Plaintiff 
was capable of earning, and was earning, his 
living. This meant that for the scales to be 
turned ... ajactor of great weight would be 
needed in the opposite scale. Typically, the 
weightiest factor ...is present when there is
found to have been a moral obligation... The 
reference ... [in Coventry] ...to the need Jor a 
moral claim is not the same as a finding that 
the scales would only tip in the Plaintiffs
favour if it could be shown that the deceased 
was under a moral obligation. ... [The] 
argument that an adult child cannot make a 
successful application, unless he or she can 
establish a moral obligation or some other 
special reason... is only correct to the extent 
that it means that there must be some reason
for the court to decide that the scales Jail in
favour [of the applicant]. So limited the 
submission is a truism which does not advance 
the argument ... Of course there has to be a 
reason justifying a court's conclusion that 
there has been a failure to make reasonable
financial provision but the use of the phrase 
"special circumstance" does not advance the 
argument. The word "special" means no more 
than what is needed to overcome the factors in 
the opposite scale. '
Sir John Knox gave express approval to 
the way in which the matter had been 
approached by Ewbank J in Re Debenham, 
deceased [1986] 1 FLR 404 in which the 
judge had rejected a submission that 
special circumstances had to be found 
outside s. 3 before the claim which he 
was considering could succeed. He had 
commented that Coventry said:
'that if a grown up man capable of working 
was going to make an application under the 
Act .. [the court] ... would look for special 
circumstances. So one would. But that is not a 
question of law, it is a question of applying 
common sense principles. '
It is thus suggested that the law relating 
to a claim by an adult child may be 
summarised in the followingo
propositions:
(1) each claim must be decided by 
balancing the statutory criteria in
s. 3;
(2) the existence or non-existence of a 
moral claim is one of the relevant 
factors under s. 3(l)(d);
(3) if the applicant is an adult with an 
earning capacity and earning his 
own living this will be a weighty 
factor against the success of a claim 
unless the existence of a moral claim 
or some other weighty factor can be 
demonstrated, sufficient to tip the 
scales in his favour. Necessitous 
circumstances alone will probably be 
insufficient. (Although, as Butler- 
Sloss LJ observed in Snapes, two 
members of the Court of Appeal in 
Coventry were clearly concerned that 
Oliver J may not have given 
sufficient weight to this factor.)
CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES
Sir John Knox commented in Snapes 
that the case was 'remarkable ... in the 
scale of alteration in the size of the 
testator's net estate' between the date of 
death and the date of trial. The facts were 
unusual.
When the testator died his estate was 
thought to be worth about £180,000. It 
consisted of his house, personal chattels 
and money, to an aggregate value of 29
£80,000; all of which he left, as the judge 
found reasonable, to his widow. In 
addition, there was a plot of land, used by 
the family business, which was valued for 
probate at £100,000. The business was 
run by the deceased's four sons and 
youngest daughter: the plaintiff did not 
have an interest in the business. The land 
was let by the deceased to the partners in 
the business and, by his will, the deceased 
specifically devised the land to them. 
Again the judge thought this was 
eminently reasonable. As Judge LJ 
observed: 'At the time when she first 
made a claim ... the claim would have 
failed'.
The trial judge had so held and this 
finding was not challenged on appeal. 
However, there was a dramatic change of 
circumstances in 1989. The partners in 
the business sold the land (together with 
adjoining land owned by them in their 
own right) to Tesco for £1 3m. The result 
was twofold:
(1) the siblings who benefited under the 
will, already comfortably off from 
their interest in the business, 
became very wealthy; and
(2) the net value of the land forming 
part of the deceased's estate was 
increased from £100,000 to 
£663,000   there was, truly, a 
windfall.
As the Court of Appeal confirmed in 
Snapes, the court must, under s. 3(5), 
assess the position as it is known to be at 
the date of the hearing. The judge was, 
therefore, right to pay full regard to the
o I J o
size and nature of the net estate as it was 
known to be post-1989 and not as it was 
thought to be at the date of death and the 
date of the application.
It was submitted by the applicants that 
the court should disregard the increase in 
size of the estate which, it was submitted, 
could not have the effect of converting a 
'bad' claim into a good one. Alternatively, 
it was said, the court should give little or 
no weight to this factor. Butler-Sloss LJ, 
giving the leading judgment, thought that 
neither argument could stand in the light 
of the 'clear words' of s. 3(5): 'the court 
shall take into account the facts as known 
to the court at the date of the hearing'.
o
Judge LJ also found the words of s. 3(5) 
to be 'unambiguous'.
Although the Court of Appeal did not 
dissect the judge's balancing exercise, 
there is no doubt that the size and nature
of the net estate and the disparity in 
circumstances between the applicant and 
the appellant beneficiaries must have 
been weighty factors which, in the 
circumstances, were sufficient to tip the 
scales in the applicant's favour when 
taken together with the expression of 
wishes made by the testator (see below).
TESTATOR'S WISHES
The testator in Snapes thought that the 
value of his estate was limited. He felt, 
reasonably, that he should leave the land 
to those running the business, so as noto '
to disrupt it, and the rest to his widow. 
However, he provided in his will that, if 
his wife should predecease him, (which, 
in the event, she did not) the £80,000 
left to her should be divided between the 
applicant, another daughter not involved 
in the business and his grandchildren. He 
also expressed the wish that, if his wife 
survived him, she should make provision 
for those persons on her death.
In Coventry Goff LJ opined that a view 
expressed by a deceased person that he 
wished a particular person to benefit will 
generally be of little significance, because 
the question which the court must 
address, i.e. 'was reasonable provision 
made?' is objective and not subjective. In 
Snapes, however, Butler-Sloss LJ said:
'A good reason to exclude a member of the 
jamily has to be a relevant consideration ... 
[In] my view, the recognition by the testator 
ofthe status of members of his Jamily and his 
goodwill towards them and in this case 
towards the plaintiff are factors which it is 
proper to take into account under s. 3( 1 )(8) 
and it isjor the court to give such weight to 
those Jactors as may in the individual case be 
appropriate.'
DELAY
Snapes was described by Sir John Knox 
as a case 'remarkable in the length of the 
delay between the death of the testator 
and the date of the hearing'. The 
deceased died on 7 September 1985. The 
applicant made her application within the 
6 months permitted by the act, but the 
case was not heard until the end of 1996, 
some 11 years later.
The long delay was suggested as being 
a reason why the increase in the size of 
the estate should be ignored. But the trial 
judge had considered the initial four year 
delay, during which the increase in the 
estate had occurred, and had acquitted 
the applicant of blame with regard to
this. There had been no material change 
of circumstances thereafter. The judge 
was not prepared to deprive the applicant 
of the award he was otherwise prepared 
to make in these circumstances, although 
he indicated that he may well have done 
so had he taken the view that the 
applicant had been at fault for the delay 
which had occurred prior to the Tesco 
sale.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the 
judge's approach with regard to this. It 
was, however, pointed out that the length 
of time a case takes to come to trial is a 
matter which the court may take into 
account under s. 3(l)(g), where 
appropriate, particularly if blame attaches 
to one of the parties and that results in a 
prejudice to the other.
CONCLUSION
Snapes emphasises that every case in 
this field turns on its own facts. Coventry 
lays down a guideline in respect of adult 
children who have an earning capacity 
and who are in employment; in such 
cases the court is likely to require a moral 
claim or some other weighty reason 
before allowing a claim. This guideline, 
however, does not apply to other adult 
children, such as the applicant in Snapes 
who, for one reason or another, has no or 
no significant earning capacity. However, 
even in the case of an adult in his or her 
prime in full employment, it is clear that 
there is no rule of law barring out a
o
claimant if a consideration of all the 
factors in s. 3 leads to the view that there 
are sufficiently weighty factors to justify 
the claim. Although not appearing in the 
judgments, Judge LJ in the course of 
argument, ventilated the case of the 
middle-class male in full employment 
who had relied upon a deceased parent to 
fund private school fees for the 
deceased's grandchildren. It may be that 
this would give rise to a 'moral claim' of 
some kind but it is suggested that, at least 
post-Snapes, it is not necessary to think in 
such terms. This is simply a relevant 
factor to weigh in the scales and it may 
well be that, in an appropriate case, it 
would be" sufficiently weighty, as many 
other factors may be, to tip the scales in 
the adult child applicant's favour. It is the 
balancing exercise of all the statutory 
criteria which is, ultimately, all- 
important. @
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